Workers' Compensation and Exclusivity of Remedy
Connecticut, like other states, has implemented a workers' compensation system that generally insulates employers from civil liability for "workplace injuries." This limited liability is provided to employers "in exchange for [the delivery of] relatively quick and certain compensation [to the injured worker].' (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 505." Yuille v. Bridgeport Hosp., 89 Conn. App. 705, 708 (2005) (citing DeOliveira v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 273 Conn. 487, 505 (2005)). In addition to this limited liability, the Connecticut legislature amended the Workers' Compensation Act ("Act") to further reduce the costs to employers in providing "compensation" to injured employees, this time by limiting benefits provided by the Act. See Mello v. Big Y Foods, Inc., 265 Conn. 21, 27 (2003) ("The purpose of these amendments was to reduce the costs in the workers' compensation system by limiting certain benefits. See Rayhall v. Akim Co., 263 Conn. 328, 348, 819 A.2d 803 (2003); Barton v. Ducci Electrical Contractors, Inc., 248 Conn. 793, 815, 730 A.2d 1149 (1999)."). See Footnote 1.
The Connecticut Supreme Court has long confirmed the acceptability of this arrangement, stating as follows:
Substantively, it is an essential part of the workers' compensation bargain that an employee, even one who has suffered such an offensive injury, relinquishes his or her potentially large common-law tort damages in exchange for relatively quick and certain compensation. See Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., supra, 196 Conn. 97.
Driscoll v. General Nutrition Corp., 252 Conn. 215, 227 (2000). Notably, the injured worker in Driscoll was prevented from obtaining relief other than that provided by the Act - which excluded the emotional distress damages she sought - despite the fact that she was "seized . . . by the neck and physically forced . . . into [a] separate room[] located in the rear of the store . . . and [then] sexually assaulted . . ." Driscoll v. General Nutrition Corp., 252 Conn. 215, 218-219 (2000). Stated another way, the sexual assault victim could only obtain the relief the legislature permitted her to obtain, and the Court took the view that it was the legislature's prerogative to provide no relief to a victim if it chose to do so. See Yuille v. Bridgeport Hosp., 89 Conn. App. 705, 708 (2005) (citation omitted) ("Like many legislative enactments, our workers' compensation law represents a compromise between competing goals. 'The fact that the remedy provided by the legislature under the act may be considered inadequate does not permit us to overlook the limits set by the legislature.'").
As Driscoll suggests, questions arise as to whether it is proper to restrict relief when injuries are not clearly "work-related" or that harm has no remedy. At present, however, Connecticut courts generally refuse to permit litigation between injured workers and employers if the Act provides inadequate remedies or no remedies whatsoever. Connecticut courts will also generally refuse to permit litigation between injured workers and employers under the theory that issues should instead be decided by the Workers' Compensation Commission. See DeOliveira v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 273 Conn. 487, 497 (2005) ("As a general matter, the commissioners have jurisdiction to 'hear all claims . . . arising under [the act] . . . .' General Statutes § 31-278.").
In one matter involving Bridgeport Hospital, which is part of the Yale-New Haven Health System and is affiliated with Yale School of Medicine, the Appellate Court explained that such a "bad faith" claim is barred by workers' compensation exclusivity. In Yuille, the plaintiff, Darcy Yuille, alleged that the defendant, Bridgeport Hospital, intentionally and in breach of good faith, had caused her to suffer emotional distress by unreasonably delaying payment of workers' compensation benefits to which she was entitled." Yuille v. Bridgeport Hosp., 89 Conn. App. 705, 707 (2005). The Appellate Court surmised that Ms. Yuille was complaining about employer conduct for which a remedy was provided under the Act, stating that "by providing remedies for such conduct, the legislature evinced its intention to bar a tort action for the same conduct proscribed and penalized under the act." Yuille v. Bridgeport Hosp., 89 Conn. App. 705, 708 (2005).
In the case relied upon by the Yuille Court, the Connecticut Supreme Court recognized that the employer's conduct and the harm complained of did not fit within the Act's definition of "workplace injury." The Connecticut Supreme Court explicitly stated that "the plaintiff has alleged an injury that appears to fall outside the general terms of the exclusivity provision, as that injury was deemed [by the Workers' Compensation Commission] not to have been causally connected to the plaintiff's employment." DeOliveira v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 273 Conn. 487, 498 (2005). See Footnote 2. The Court, however, salvaged exclusivity by expanding definition of "workplace injury" to include injury and other harm suffered from the "processing" of a workers' compensation claim. See DeOliveira v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 273 Conn. 487, 504 (2005) (The Court decided "that we must construe the exclusionary provision's prohibition on damages actions for injuries 'arising out of and in the course of . . . employment' to include injuries arising out of and in the course of the workers' compensation claims process."). In other words, employers were now, potentially, presented with an argument that they are (or should be) insulated from civil liability for both the initial "workplace injury" and also for any additional harm that an injured employee suffers while the workers' compensation claim is pending. This, however, underscores tension as to the extent of exclusivity. As the Connecticut Supreme Court acknowledged long before DeOliveira, "[p]rohibiting a civil action in such a case 'would allow a corporation to 'cost-out' an investment decision to kill workers.' Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 617, 433 N.E.2d 572 (1982) (Celebrezze, J., concurring)." Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229 Conn. 99, 109 (1994). See Footnote 3.
In a case involving Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc.), which is also part of the Yale-New Haven Health System and is likewise affiliated with the Yale School of Medicine, litigation was stricken though without a written decision stating the reason for the termination of litigation. In Desmond v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc., the trial court was presented with multiple allegations by which the injured worker alleged that the employer ignored and denied prescribed medical treatment despite warnings concerning the detrimental impacts of such conduct. One medical opinion explained the jeopardy faced by the injured worker as follows:
[A]ctivities of daily living are severely curtailed. She cannot drive. It is appalling that her treatment has been held up for the past 4½ years. [The injured employee's] treating physician has wanted to follow a standard of care for treating this disabling condition. A standard of care has been prevented by the insurance company who has essentially denied almost all treatments. At this point waiting any longer jeopardizes any chance of recovery."
Another treating physician issued a separate but equally dire warning, explaining that the:
"[f]ailure to provide this [treatment] would seal her fate as unable to use her hands permanently.”
The injured worker also presented an allegation concerning the aggressive vehicular surveillance of her family, which caused the injured worker to fear for the safety of herself and her children. The only response from Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc., by its attorney at Letizia, Ambrose & Falls, P.C., was to suggest that the injured worker report the matter to the police. See E-mail Correspondence ("[M]y only suggestion . . . is that, if you have concerns about aggressive or unsafe behavior by anyone in relation to your family, then you have the right to contact your local police agency. --Andy"). Because of the refusal by Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc. to control its investigator's behavior, the police contacted the surveillance company. See Police Report.
Notwithstanding the tension that exists between affirming both the structural purpose of workers' compensation exclusivity and the essential function of exceptions to exclusivity, it is proper to construe exceptions narrowly. However, as the Connecticut Supreme Court has acknowledged, there needs to be a balance so that the rule does not swallow the exception. Stated another way, the rule cannot become so wooden and inflexible that employers are permitted to cost out death and injury. See Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229 Conn. 99, 109 (1994) ("Prohibiting a civil action in such a case 'would allow a corporation to 'cost-out' an investment decision to kill workers.").
As the Connecticut Appellate Court explained:
[t]he court described its decision in Suarez I as establishing an exception to workers' compensation exclusivity if the employee can prove either that the employer actually intended to injure the [employee] or that the employer intentionally created a dangerous condition that made the [employee's] injuries substantially certain to occur . . . . Id., 777-78. The court stated that [p]ermitting an employee to sue an employer for injuries intentionally caused to him constitutes a narrow exception to the exclusivity of the act. . . . Since the legal justification for the common-law action is the nonaccidental character of the injury from the . . . employer's standpoint, the common-law liability of the employer cannot . . . be stretched to include accidental injuries caused by the gross, wanton, wilful, deliberate, intentional, reckless, culpable, or malicious negligence, breach of statute, or other misconduct of the employer short of a conscious and deliberate intent directed to the purpose of inflicting an injury. . . . What is being tested is not the degree of gravity of the employer's conduct, but, rather, the narrow issue of intentional versus accidental conduct. . . . Id., 778-79.
Dusto v. Rogers Corp., 222 Conn. App. 71, 81 (2023) (citing Lucenti v. Laviero, 327 Conn. 764 (2018).
In addition to the continuing recognition of exceptions to exclusivity, Connecticut has also recognized the need to study delays in medical treatment because of the significant, health-related and economic consequences caused by treatment delays. See Footnote 4. With respect to H.B. 6916, a co-sponsor of the bill explained on his legislative website the importance of avoiding delays, specifically referencing an injured worker whose conditioned worsened as a result of the delays.
"Earlier this year, I testified before the Labor Committee with my constituent, Mark Wickerd, a Griswold resident, who suffered a major injury while serving as a fire fighter. He needed surgery, but it was unnecessarily delayed for over a year. Mark continues to struggle because of the incident, but he is fighting alongside myself and others to change the system."
- Rep. Brian Lanoue
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Footnote 1: "The purpose of these amendments was to reduce the costs in the workers' compensation system by limiting certain benefits. See Rayhall v. Akim Co., 263 Conn. 328, 348, 819 A.2d 803 (2003); Barton v. Ducci Electrical Contractors, Inc., 248 Conn. 793, 815, 730 A.2d 1149 (1999). This court has considered the legitimacy of such an aim in light of the state and federal constitutions and has concluded that cutting costs is a legitimate legislative interest. See Barton v. Ducci Electrical Contractors, Inc., supra, 818." Mello v. Big Y Foods, Inc., 265 Conn. 21, 27 (2003).
Footnote 2: The Workers' Compensation Commission identified the injury as one that was not covered by the Connecticut Workers' Compensation Act. See DeOliveira v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 273 Conn. 487, 496 (2005) ("Specifically, the board concluded, when reviewing the plaintiff's appeal, that his emotional injury was not proximately caused by his employment. Thus, the injury for which the plaintiff seeks damages is not, strictly speaking, a personal injury that arises out of and in the course of employment and, accordingly, would appear to fall outside the scope of the exclusivity provision.").
Footnote 3: "With respect to the intent element, this court previously has recognized a narrow exception to the exclusivity provision for intentional torts. Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229 Conn. 99, 104, 639 A.2d 507 (1994). That exception was grounded, however, in the 'accidental' injury language of the act; see General Statutes § 31-275 (1); and the fact that such conduct falls well outside the terms of the bargain struck under the act." DeOliveira v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 273 Conn. 487, 506 (2005).
Footnote 4: On June 21, 2019, Gov. Ned Lamont signed “An Act Establishing a Task Force to Study Remedies and Potential Liability for Unreasonably Contested or Delayed Worker’s Compensation Claims.” Link