The Connecticut Workers' Compensation Act
The Connecticut Workers’ Compensation Act (Act) represents Connecticut's public policy directive for the implementation of a system by which an employee suffering "personal injury 'arising out of and in the course of his employment,' and for an injury which is a hazard of that employment", receives compensation. Sullins v. UPS, 315 Conn. 543, 551 (2015). In other words, employees who suffer injuries incidental to employment are entitled to apply for compensation pursuant to the Act, with the Connecticut Workers' Compensation Commission being authorized to decide whether injuries are incidental to employment. See DeJesus v. R.P.M. Enters., 204 Conn. App. 665, 701 (2021) ("Our Supreme Court has stated that a 'commissioner's . . . jurisdiction is limited to adjudicating claims arising under the act, that is, claims by an injured employee seeking compensation from his [or her] employer for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment.' (Emphasis added.) Stickney v. Sunlight Construction, Inc., 248 Conn. 754, 762, 730 A.2d 630 (1999).").
'Incidental' in this context 'has been defined as something [that] happens as a chance or undesigned feature of something else; casual, hence not of prime concern; subordinate; collateral.' Stakonis v. United Advertising Corp., 110 Conn. 384, 390, 148 A. 334 (1930). '[An] activity is incidental to the employment [and therefore compensable] . . . [i]f the activity is regularly engaged in on the employer's premises within the period of the employment, with the employer's approval or acquiescence . . . .' McNamara v. Hamden, 176 Conn. 547, 556, 398 A.2d 1161 (1979)." Clements v. Aramark Corp., 339 Conn. 402, 415 (2021). It is important to note, however, that injuries occurring off the employer's premises may still be incidental to employment and, therefore, compensable under the Act. See Footnote 1. In other words, "[s]peaking generally, an injury arises out of an employment when it occurs in the course of the employment and as a proximate cause of it" without regard to the location where the injury occurs. Hart v. Fed. Express Corp., 321 Conn. 1, 20 (2016).
The Act specifies that an employee suffering an injury 'arising out of and in the course of employment,' or incidental to that employment, is to receive "compensation" - which is also defined by the Act. Such compensation "includ[es], but [is] not limited to, indemnity, medical and surgical aid or hospital and nursing service". See C.G.S. Section 31-275(4). Notably, the Act states that an employer "shall furnish any medical and surgical aid or hospital and nursing service, including medical rehabilitation services and prescription drugs, as the physician, surgeon, physician assistant or advanced practice registered nurse deems reasonable or necessary". See C.G.S. Section 31-294d.
The benefit to the employee under the Act comes from two asserted principles. First, the employee does not need to prove that the employer is liable for causing the work-related injury in order to make a claim for "compensation." See Footnote 2. Second, "compensation" is supposed to be provided in a quick and certain manner. See Footnote 3.
An employee, in exchange for receiving such “compensation” (or, more appropriately, in exchange for being given the right to submit a claim “compensation”), is generally precluded from suing for additional damages. Courts in Connecticut have described this ‘quid pro quo’ of workers' compensation exclusivity as follows:
This same purpose has been referenced again and again in the application of WCA in Connecticut over the one-hundred-plus years since its enactment, as reflected more recently in the Supreme Court's decisions in Lucenti v. Laviero, 327 Conn. 764, 773-74, 176 A.3d 1 (2018): ''...[the WCA's] exclusivity represents a balancing of interests, insofar as the purpose of the act 'is to compensate the worker for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, without regard to fault, by imposing a form of strict liability on the employer;' and Velecela v. All Habitat Services, LLC, 322 Conn. 335, 141 A.3d 778 (2016): [by imposing its bar to private claims for personal injury damages] 'even [to] one who has suffered offensive injury, [who must] relinquish his or her potentially large common-law tort damages in exchange for relatively quick and certain compensation.'
The WCA 'exclusive remedy' protection for the employer in compliance with its obligation to provide benefits, and the requirement to demonstrate the ability to do so are set forth in § 31-284 . . .
Rivera-Santana v. Conn. Spring & Stamping Corp., 2024 Conn. Super. LEXIS 49, *24-25 (O'Hanlan, J., January 9, 2024).
See also Doe v. Yale Univ., 252 Conn. 641, 672 (2000) ("'Under the statute, the employee surrenders his right to bring a common law action against the employer, thereby limiting the employer's liability to the statutory amount. . . . In return, the employee is compensated for his or her losses without having to prove liability. . . . In a word, these statutes compromise an employee's right to a common law tort action for work related injuries in return for relatively quick and certain compensation. . . . Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 381, 698 A.2d 859 (1997). The intention of the framers of the act was to establish a speedy, effective and inexpensive method for determining claims for compensation. Taylor v. St. Paul's Universalist Church, 109 Conn. 737, 147 A. 671 [1929]. . . . Chieppo v. Robert E. McMichael, Inc., 169 Conn. 646, 653, 363 A.2d 1085 (1975).' (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Casey v. Northeast Utilities, 249 Conn. 365, 378-79, 731 A.2d 294 (1999).").
Employers Covered by Workers’ Compensation in Connecticut
Workers’ compensation in Connecticut covers, with certain exceptions, all employers employing at least one employee. See C.G.S. Section 31-275(10)
Employees Covered by Workers’ Compensation in Connecticut
Workers’ compensation in Connecticut covers nearly all employees regardless of occupation or how long the employee has worked for the employer. See C.G.S. Section 31-275(9)
Medical Benefits Available to Injured Connecticut Employees
The Act states that employers “shall furnish any medical and surgical aid or hospital and nursing service, including medical rehabilitation services and prescription drugs, as the physician, surgeon, physician assistant or advanced practice registered nurse deems reasonable or necessary” to treat an injury 'arising out of and in the course of employment.' See C.G.S. Section 31-294d.
Indemnity Benefits Available to Injured Connecticut Employees
A workplace injury: (a) may be insufficiently severe to limit an employee's ability to work the same position; (b) may limit an employee’s ability to work the same position (i.e., require work restrictions or light duty); or (c) may result in an inability to work (i.e., disable the employee from working). While medical treatment is, or should be, available for the treatment of any workplace injury, there are two general categories of indemnity payments available to compensate injured employees: partial disability benefits and total disability benefits.
With respect to partial disability benefits, benefits are provided pursuant to C.G.S. Section 31-308. C.G.S. Section 31-308 provides – with exceptions – that an injured worker who has suffered a temporary partial disability is entitled to benefits based upon the ability to perform work that is different in type or duration when compared to the work that person performed at the time of the injury. That injured worker should receive compensation payable at 75% of the difference between the amount earned while working the temporary position and the position worked at the time of the injury. These benefits are limited in duration as defined by the benefits table in the statute. See C.G.S. Section 31-308.
For example, pursuant to C.G.S. Section 31-308 the legislature has decreed (as of 2024) that an injured worker is entitled to 155 weeks of benefits payments – multiplied by the impairment rating for the injured body part – for loss of use of one leg at or above knee. If such an injured worker has lost 10% use of one leg (the impairment rating is 0.10), that person would be entitled to receive 75% of the difference between the amount earned while working the temporary position and the amount earned when injured for 15.5 weeks (or 155 weeks x 0.10).
With respect to the potential receipt of additional partial disability benefits pursuant to C.G.S. Section 31-308a, an Administrative Law Judge of the Connecticut Workers' Compensation Commission may find that an injured worker is also entitled to “additional compensation benefits for such partial permanent disability equal to seventy-five per cent of the difference between the wages currently earned by an employee in a position comparable to the position held by such injured employee prior to his injury”. C.G.S. Section 31-308a(a). Importantly, these 31-308a benefits are unavailable until 31-308 benefits have been exhausted, or paid in full, with payment of 31-308a benefits wholly dependent upon a determination by the Workers' Compensation Commission that “the nature of the injury and its effect on the earning capacity of an employee warrant additional compensation.” C.G.S. Section 31-308a(b).
With respect to total disability benefits, injured workers disabled totally from working due to a work-related injury or illness should receive 75% of that person’s average weekly wage prior to the injury. See C.G.S. Section 31-307. Benefits may be payable until the disability lessens and the employee is able to work.
Other benefits include vocational rehabilitation (See C.G.S. Section 31-293a) and death benefits and burial expenses (See C.G.S. Section 31-306).
If you have information to share about this issue, please send an e-mail.
_____________________________________
Footnote 1: "[T]he plaintiff in the present case was injured while performing one of the essential functions of her employment, namely, bringing health care to patients' homes. . . . Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiff's injury did, in fact, arise out of her employment, thereby satisfying the statutory test for workers' compensation." Labadie v. Norwalk Rehab. Servs., 274 Conn. 219, 239 (2005)."
Footnote 2: "[T]he purpose of the act was to create a no-fault system to compensate employees for accidental injuries that occur in the course of and in connection with the employment. See, e.g., Powers v. Hotel Bond Co., 89 Conn. 143, 146, 93 A. 245 (1915) ("by eliminating the proof of negligence, by minimizing the delay in the award and by making it reasonably certain, [the act] seeks to avoid the great waste of the tort action and to promote better feeling between [employee] and employer, and accepts, as an inevitable condition of industry, the happening of accident, and charges its cost to the industry"). Clements v. Aramark Corp., 339 Conn. 402, 446-447 (2021).
Footnote 3: "'The fact that the remedy provided by the legislature under the act may be considered inadequate does not permit us to overlook the limits set by the legislature. . . . It is an essential part of the workers' compensation bargain that an employee, even one who has suffered . . . an offensive injury, relinquishes his or her potentially large common-law tort damages in exchange for relatively quick and certain compensation.' (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 505." Yuille v. Bridgeport Hosp., 89 Conn. App. 705, 708 (2005) (citing DeOliveira v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 273 Conn. 487, 505 (2005)).